on Moral Theology builds on the distinction between morality and ethics, and shows various ways in which the concept of "spirituality" occurs in contemporary theology. The importance of distinguishing yet not separating ethics and spirituality is then argued.] T HERE ARE promising and problematic connections between ethics and the emerging phenomena of spirituality. Any definitive resolution of this relationship would be premature because the discipline of spirituality is still defining itself. The variety of spiritualities is enormous, ranging from New Age practices to feminist political writings and Twelve Step programs.
The recent widespread interest in spirituality in American Protestant circles may be attributed to an increased interest in more personal forms of religion, to ecumenical interaction, and to popular retrieval of Reformation piety described by Charles Taylor as "the affirmation of ordinary ike."* Although initially suspected by some as a reappearance of anti-intellectual pietism, spirituality has begun to appear as a regular component of Protestant seminary curricula and in widely read texts by Protestant theologians.
TERMS OF DISCUSSION
First, a provisional stipulation about terminology. Let me distinguish morality from ethics and, in parallel fashion, spirituality as lived experience from spirituality as academic reflection. "Morality" refers to "first-order" descriptive accounts of the lived experience of human values and obligations. It is a rich "fabric of sensibilitiesperceptions, beliefs and practices." 10 "Ethics" refers to the "second-order" reflection that probes their rational supports and systematic interconnections. Bernard McGinn makes an analogous distinction about two orders of discourse in spirituality. "Lived spirituality/' analogous to morality, refers to the practice of transformative, affective, practical, and holistic disciplines that seek to connect the person with reality's deepest meanings. It is concerned not primarily with isolated experiences such as visions or insights, but with a way of Ufe that consciously seeks to live in tune with ultimate or comprehensive realities. "Reflective spirituality," analogous to ethics, stands for the second-order interpretation and communication of this dimension of experience as experience. It employs theological, historical-contextual, artistic, anthropological, and hermeneutical methods to analyze the lived experience.
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Morality and lived spirituality overlap inasmuch as devotional practices often seek to inculcate virtues and pursue moral values to their ultimate depths. However, morality and lived spirituality cannot be identified, because spirituality often adresses regions of experience that seem "off the scale" of ordinary morality. At one end of the spectrum, radically evil threats to meaning such as the scandal of the Holocaust and ecological devastation have generated contemporary spiritualities; so too have the witness of heroic sanctity and mystical union with the Good at the other extreme. 13 In addition, morality does not emphasize personal transformation and holistic integration to the degree which most forms of lived spirituality do.
Many versions of lived spirituality are more pedagogical than ordinary morality. They inculcate a way of life by practices of study, meditation, and compassion that develop certain intellectual, moral, and religious capacities.
14 With the help of a guide or director, these prac- . Foster, a Quaker, describes the gradual transformation from a life of self-interest and fear to one that welcomes God's abundance. This transformation is God's work in which the person cooperates by committed practice of traditional spiritual disciplines. Foster describes four "inward disciplines" (meditation, prayer, fasting, and study), four "outward disciplines" (simplicity, solitude, tices help the person break with an unauthentic way of existence in order to embrace a more authentic level, usually through contact with a more radical level of reality. 15 The spiritual disciplines then provide a structure for deepening and expanding the initial conversion.
16
Ethics and reflective spirituality may examine the same phenomena but on different grounds. The virtue of compassion and practices of justice may be justified normatively by philosophical ethics or by theological and metaphysical warrants. Since disciplined reflection on spiritual experience should be normative as well as historical, reflective spirituality remains incomplete without reference to ethics. Spirituality, however, is not merely the application of principles derived from religious morality and belief, as in the older Catholic definition of "ascetical and mystical theology" that served as practical adjuncts to "dogmatic theology." Other problems arise in the relation of lived spirituality to ethics. Some practitioners want spiritual practices to "do the work" of ethical reflection by immediately and intuitively grounding their preferred way of life. Conversely, some ethicists consider the practices of spirituality to be sectarian because they are not accountable to public criteria of truth and meaning. 18 The relation between reflective spirituality and ethics is more promising, since the former can expand the scope of ethics beyond a strictly formal or impartialist account, while ethics can encourage the study of spirituality to move beyond historisubmission, and service), and finally four "corporate disciplines" (confession, worship, guidance, and celebration). 
Perception
What we value depends on what we pay attention to and how we pay attention to it. We make choices in the world that we notice, and what we notice is shaped by the metaphors and habits of the heart that we bring to experience. These resources for attentiveness may be derived from spirituality or from morality and ethics. Prior to thinking clearly about injustice one needs to recognize situations as morally problematic and also notice salient features in them that can lead to change. Evil conditions persist more frequently by reason of apathy and moral obtuseness than by conscious collusion. New moral categories like sexism and racism make us less obtuse to forms of injustice that had previously been taken for granted. 24 Philosophers and social critics fashion new moral categories, but how does one acquire the virtues that foster moral discernment and clarity?
Beiden C. Lane turns to the desert to learn moral attentiveness and indifference. 25 He posits "the surly, discourteous piety of the desert fathers and mothers" as the antidote to the egoistic, undemanding niceness of much American spirituality. Stimulated by the endless onslaught of consumer culture, we are "plagued by a highly diffused attention" and "give ourselves to everything lightly. In saying yes to everything, we attend to nothing." 26 The desert teaches that attentiveness comes out of familiarity with emptiness. "Indifference" is the "slowly-learned attitude of abandonment that comes from prolonged desert experience. the hard discipline of self-emptying takes place through solidarity with the suffering.
Iris Murdoch, the prolific novelist and occasional philosopher, writes about the importance of moral attention from a spirituality that is nontheistic.
29 She has for some time urged that ordinary moral vision is egocentric and needs transformation by getting connected with a transcendent source of beauty and goodness, some version of Plato's Form of the Good. 30 Unfortunately, she did not mention any practical means to effect this transformation. Recently she has discovered spiritual practices to train moral perceptiveness. Contemplative prayer, even without reference to God, can help purify human desires. Attachment to a transcendent goodness and beauty detaches us from sentimental distortion of the other, thereby freeing us to appreciate the other as it is. "But there is also a natural way of mysticism, as indicated by St. Paul, which involves a deepened and purified apprehension of our surroundings."
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Zen meditation provides the forms of spiritual practice for this natural mysticism. Through practices that empty the mind, Zen engenders the typically Buddhist respect and love of all things by training the person to empty the self by focusing on small details of ordinary life and nature.
32 Admittedly, such practices do not guarantee moral improvement: "One may not be sure that those who observe stones and snails lovingly will also thus observe human beings, but such observation is a way, an act of respect for individuals, which is itself a virtue, and an image of virtue."
33 Murdoch believes that with the collapse of traditional religion new forms of spiritual practice must be discovered to connect morality with its mystical background. "We can make our own rites and images, we can preserve the concept of holiness."
34
At the level of perception, the practices of spirituality do not threaten ethics, but they can correct the abstract and universal emphases of some philosophies that neglect the particular contours of actual persons and unique situations. acter. Religion has often been more aware of the connection between vision and virtue, as Murdoch points out: The most evident bridge between morality and religion is the idea of virtue" which calls us to a goodness that goes beyond fulfilling our duties. 35 Spiritual practices aim to inculcate specific habits of the heart that will serve to guide conduct. Dispositions like justice and compassion establish an embedded network of values that functions normatively in at least two ways. 36 It screens out contrary courses of action and sets the context for evaluating particular deeds. Proposed actions that harmonize with the set of dispositions will be discerned as appropriate, while those that clash with it are discerned as unfitting. 37 In practical discernment the set of dispositions exercises a normative function often neglected by philosophers and theologians who concentrate on rules and principles as the only normative elements in morality.
Motivation

38
Many contemporary spiritualities shy away from explicit moral norms and principles. They often rely on a set of dispositions that are expected to characterize the practitioner and function normatively in decision and action. It is not clear that any set of dispositions can do all the work of ethics. Although dispositions are scenarios of action for those who follow a particular spiritual path, it is not clear that they can provide the explicit normative criteria that are needed to justify action to those outside that spirituality. Let me cite two instances of spiritualities that present a normative Gestalt of dispositions in place of rules and principles:
(1) Gustavo Gutiérrez does not outline a theory of justice or apply the norms of just-war theory to the problem of revolution. Instead he describes a pattern of familiar gospel dispositions that have been reshaped by the Latin American struggle for liberation: conversion as a requirement for solidarity, gratuitousness as the atmosphere for effective action, joy as the victory over suffering, spiritual childhood, radical dependence on God as the requirement for commitment to the poor, and community born out of solitude. 39 The encounter with God that occurs in identifying with the poor in Christian faith ought to evoke these particular virtues; it establishes a path along which these dispositions are the roadmarkers. Like every major Christian spirituality, this path is shaped by the gospel story and specific sociohistorical challenges: "the concrete forms of the following of Jesus are connected with the great historical movements of an age."
40
This spirituality of liberation is grounded in self-conscious reflection which includes critical interpretations of Scripture, theology, sociohistorical conditions, philosophy, and other traditional spiritualities with which it shares common patterns of Christian discipleship such as those reflected in the writings of John of the Cross.
41
(2) Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza also presents a normative pattern of dispositions behind her proposals for an emancipatory feminist biblical hermeneutics. Although her work is concerned more with critical method than with explicating a spiritual experience, she mentions features common to other spiritualities: conversion, struggle against entrenched evil, the discovery of the divine presence in the struggle, practices of imagination and celebration.
42
Schüssler Fiorenza, however, stands in sharp contrast to Gutiérrez when it comes to dispositional content and justification. Scripture, she argues, cannot set any normative pattern of dispositions for feminism because it is thoroughly contaminated by androcentric interpretation and inscribed patterns of domination. Every authority is subject to the authority of experience expressed in contemporary feminist praxis. One aim controls the reading of Scripture: to determine "whether and how Scripture can become an enabling, motivating resource and empowering authority in women's struggle for justice, liberation, and solidarity."
43
The normative set of dispositions is grounded in contemporary democratic and egalitarian convictions rather than in theology, tradition, or philosophical ethics. A "spirituality of vision and imagination" grounded in the logic of democracy "requires passionate involvement, respect, and recognition of the other, desire for justice, recognition of needs, zest for life, the capacity to relate to others, and especially the vision of a different community of equals." 44 danger is that her approach might ultimately undermine the authority of the New Testament so thoroughly that its liberating power would also be lost, as the church finds its identity increasingly shaped by the ideals of liberal democracy and the apparent dictates of contemporary experience," 45 Unlike Gutiérrez, this spirituality of liberation seems immune to criticism from Scripture or tradition. The experience of struggle against patriarchy judges the Bible, doctrinal and moral theology; but can anything judge the movement? Schüssler Fiorenza's work may indicate what happens when the lived spirituality of a movement lacks an adequate theoretical justification.
Other spiritualities ground their strategies and practices in psychology as well as in ethical and religious warrants. James D.
Whitehead and Evelyn Eaton Whitehead analyze the negative emotions of anger, shame and guilt and suggest practical ways to transform them in creative directions. 46 Wilkie Au and Noreen Cannon use Scripture and Jungian psychology to address contemporary issues from workaholism to individuation.
47
Identity
Ethics and spirituality make identity a central concern. Both assume that action flows from the specific identity of the person, the constellation of habits, commitments, and emotions that we call character. Since we tend to discern the moral appropriateness of actions in relation to our "sense of self," the question of identity assumes priority in moral reflection. Who we think we are and who we want to become, our identity, comes to a considerable extent from identification, namely, the persons, causes and values with which we identify. Spirituality usually adds a transformative urgency to the question of identity. When the self overidentifies with external goods like success, power, and pleasure, it is bound to be unauthentic. Spiritualities insist on conversion and dedication to worthwhile sources of meaning in order to forge a genuine identity.
In her recent historical survey Love Your Enemies, Lisa Sowie Cahill finds that the issue of identity lies behind the tension between Christian pacifism and just-war theories. Advocates of just-war theory, on the other hand, usually miss the lived spirituality that drives Christian pacifism because they interpret it through the lens of ethics. Christian pacifism, however, cannot be understood to be a strategy deduced from a general conviction of the value of human life. Nor is it concerned with detailing exceptions to a general moral prohibition against violence. Rather, Christian pacifism "seems to arise before the point at which just war thinking begins. It asks first of all not about the exceptional case, but about the quality of a communal life based in Christ and in the kingdom of God, a life that turns out to make violence incomprehensible.
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Christian pacifism is originally a lived spirituality whose second-order discourse may perhaps be better understood as a reflective spirituality than an ethics. This second-order discourse has an ethical dimension that is translated into certain moral practices and prohibitions. Pacifism's moral stance rests on an intuition that violence is incompatible with Christian identity. That intuition cannot always be expressed in terms that will be persuasive to others, even fellow Christians, who do not share that same spirituality. This failure will almost certainly occur if the critic insists that the discussion be carried on in the language of strategy and political prudence or if one rules out religious warrants as "sectarian" or insufficiently "public. telligible. When pacifists couch their witness too narrowly, however, they court misunderstanding from those who do not share their spirituality. Although spirituality cannot do the work of ethics, ethicists ought not to dismiss spirituality as necessarily premoral or sectarian.
The question of identity also lies at the heart of the discussion about the environmental crisis.
53 Do we conceive of nature anthropocentrically or as a complex system of which humanity is one part among many? Should our moral community extend beyond humanity to other sentient and nonsentient beings? Environmental devastation is increasingly seen not only as immoral but also as a violation of the sacred. Buddhist forms of ecospirituality are invoked to resacralize nature. Practices of meditation contribute to a reinterpretation of personal identity: "By accepting and yielding to .... groundlessness I can discover that / have always been grounded not as a self-contained being but as one manifestation of a web of relationships which encompasses everything." 54 This identification with the whole shapes an ecospirituality that inculcates the virtues of interdependence and universal compassion.
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John D'Arcy May calls for a critical correlation of Buddhist and Christian resources to ground an interreligious ecological ethic. Today's "consumerist" ethic ("I want it all, and I want it now") can be checked by a more ascetic ethic ("I want it, but I don't need it"). Spiritual practices of the world's religious traditions, however, propose a "contemplative" ethic whose motto would be "I don't want it, because I love it." If I espouse this stance, possessing or exploiting the desired object "would seem like a betrayal of myself and my world." 56 Western
Buddhists have pioneered a more activist ecological ethic of care, but they have had difficulty integrating it into a Western appreciation of rights and justice. May argues that the two traditions are not incompatible, and that "deep ecology requires a deep ecumenism" which can integrate an ethics of justice with an ethics of cosmic care.
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The question remains, however, whether the theoretical foundations of Buddhism will be adequate to ground a social morality. A Western Buddhist critic faults his coreligionists for being "committed to ethically unproblematic issues-like rainforests, whales, primal peoples, animal rights, even human rights and world peace-and to all forms of service, rather than involving themselves with the militant wretched of the Earth (especially those close to home), and with the structural violence of our social system." 58 Christian commentators voice similar concerns, fearing that the Buddhist principles of interconnectedness and "mutually conditioned co-origination" may lead to a "depersonalizing of ethics, thus undermining the concept of responsibility with its intrinsically social dimension." 59 "The widening circle of ethical concerns must not skip over human beings, but move through them." 60 However much we identify with nature and the earth, the fact remains that the cost of ecocide are borne mostly by the poor and people of color. The convergence between certain Buddhist and Christian practices at the level of lived spirituality may be undermined by incompatible ethical and ontological suppositions at the more theoretical level.
CONCLUSION
In ecospirituality and Christian pacifism a cause integrates the self and locates it in a comprehensive framework of meaning. Certain actions are morally proscribed because they would betray the sense of self which has been fashioned by spiritual convictions and practices. Moral philosophy does not seem capable of creating personal identity. Philosophical ethics may have to be content to set certain outer limits of action that will inevitably remain rather formal. Ethics must look to specific traditions and movements to fill in the outline with narratives, symbols and practices that constitute a more or less coherent way of life. Reflective spirituality should be one of these supplementary sources for ethics. It may also be true that every ethics rests on some particular tradition that implicitly contains a life narrative that gives content to virtue terms and gives priority to some common human values over others. The authors cited here connect spirituality and ethics in relatively irenic approaches because, with some exceptions, they are compatible with philosophical ethics and universalist forms of theological ethics. In the ideal sense, spiritualities get their practitioners in touch with meaning that is humane and constructive of human community. Indeed, some would reserve the name "spirituality" to these constructive practices and movements.
An examination of spiritualities that reject ethics would be the topic for another study. Moral perception, motivation, and identity can be enhanced by most of the forms of spirituality that I have examined. Some are religious; some are primarily moral but presume an undogmatic religious background. The least dogmatic of the authors, Iris Murdoch, makes a good case that at base morality, religion, and mysticism overlap. Spiritualities that arise from an experience of great trauma, like the Holocaust, ecocide, or the oppression of women and the poor, may be more susceptible to using spirituality ideologically. The sacred is enlisted as an ally to remedy social conditions of evil. However, if the sacred is primarily used as an instrument rather than appreciated in its own right, legitimate suspicions arise. Some movement spiritualities are more willing to be accountable to other visions and voices than to those coming from their own ranks. Insofar as they are not accountable to other voices, they run the risk of being insular and ideological, because they will inculcate some of the very oppressive and exclusionary traits that their writings denounce.
